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1 INTRODUCTION 
The new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) has been viewed by many 
commentators as favouring larger unions and as conferring distinct ad-
vantages on unions with majority support at the establishment or industry 
level. While there was some shift between early drafts and the final ver-
sion of the LRA, there can be no doubt that the LRA is designed to make 
union size and, by extension. union organising strategy, a key factor in 
future employer-union relations. 
For the state to have an influence on the operation of unions is not new 
in South African industrial relations. In future, industrial relations and the 
labour market are to be regulated primarily through collective bargaining, 
presumably with little state intervention. To this end, the LRA extends and 
deepens legislative support for collective bargaining, without imposing a 
duty to bargain. This stance has been supported by the Labour Market 
Commission and by the government's macroeconomic strategy. To en-
sure that collective bargaining can act as an effective regulatory mecha-
nism, strong bargaining partners are required and the implicit assumption 
in the LRA is that fewer. larger unions will be more effective representa-
tives of workers' interests in the collective bargaining process. 
In its attempt to promote larger, more representative unions, the LRA, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, places the rationalisation of 
union structure firmly on the agenda. The issues raised by this involve not 
only changes to current arrangements in the number of unions and the 
workers over whom they have jurisdiction, but also changing the way that 
unions operate so as to make them more effective and efficient in relation 
to how they organise, represent and mobilise wage earners. These are 
matters which go to the heart of union goals and strategies in any society 
and they take on a particular urgency in the context of the rapid macro-
economic and political changes being experienced in South Africa since 
the demise of apartheid. 
This article will address three tasks: firstly, to analyse the assumptions 
underlying the rationalisation of union structure; secondly, to analyse the 
way that the LRA addresses union structure; and, finally. to outline current 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
The broad aim will be to assess whether the assumptions about union 
structure in the LRA present appropriate and realistic challenges to the 
organisational strategies of unions and, indeed, whether they are likely to 
enhance collective bargaining in general. 
2 RATIONALISING UNION STRUCTURE 
The concern with union structure in the LRA is by no means unique and 
follows a trend of structural change in the union movements of a number 
of countries, in many cases initiated by unions themselves, but also in-
duced or supported by legislation. One of the more dramatic comparative 
examples is that of Australia where the number of unions was reduced 
from 326 in 1986 to 142 in 1995 (Labour Force Australia 1995). This rapid 
consolidation was set in motion by the Australian Congress of Trade 
Unions (ACTU), but was supported by government moves to revise the 
minimum size required for union registration. The rationale underlying 
this process of reform was to create fewer, larger unions which were 
assumed to be more efficient and better positioned to participate in social 
and policy debates. 
In the UK since 1979 there has also been a "progressive and continued 
concentration of union membership within the largest unions, particularly 
since 1987" (Willman and Cave 1994: 395). This process has been marked 
by the formation of "super-unions", such as the AEEU and Unison,' unions 
which have been established via mergers between large unions, rather 
than the more usual process of a merger between a large union and one 
or more smaller unions. But the underlying rationale of this process of 
reform has been the protection of membership, not only the absolute 
number of members belonging to unions, but also relative membership. 
The shift in focus to relative membership in parts of the British union 
movement has been termed "market-share trade unionism", a form of 
unionism which is influenced by the economic constraints of member 
recruitment. In this case, union mergers are driven not only by a decline 
in membership, but by the savings achievable through concentrating 
members in single, large organisations. 
Canada has also experienced significant merger activity, although in this 
situation the reasons have been more varied. The most common reason 
has been to deal with declining membership, but small unions have also 
sought to access the resources and expertise of larger unions, and merg-
ers have occurred for political-ideological reasons (Ewer and Yates 1995). 
Underlying many of these changes have been a few key assumptions. 
Firstly, it is assumed that the presence of many small unions should be 
reduced. Small unions are thought to be inefficient as they are unable to 
I AEEU: Amalgamated Engineering & Electrical Union. Previously Amalgamated Engi-
neering Union (AEU) and Electrical. Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing 
Union (EEPTU) 
70 
Unison: Formerly the Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE), National 
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cope with the costs of running an organisation. are not able to service 
their members properly and are often dependent on idiosyncratic, indi-
vidual leadership. Moreover. the existence of large numbers of small 
unions perpetuates fragmentation of a union movement and weakens 
workers vis-a-vis employers. 
Secondly. it is assumed that larger unions should be promoted and that 
union members should be concentrated in larger organisations. Larger 
unions are supposedly able to derive economies of scale in relation to 
bargaining strength and the level of membership service. Larger unions 
are also seen to be more powerful by virtue of numbers and their ability 
to make greater gains in the collective bargaining process. 
Thirdly. it is assumed that the jurisdiction of unions should be stream-
lined and that there shQuld be fewer unions operating in each industrial 
sector. Rationalising union jurisdiction is said to reduce disputes between 
unions. enable unions to establish coherent wage policies and engage in 
industrial policy formulation at an industry or sectoral level (Chaison 1995). 
These assumptions, although often borne out in practice. do raise some 
general problems that warrant consideration. With regard to the question 
of union size, Chaison points out that small unions are not necessarily 
inefficient. particularly where they negotiate a limited number of collective 
agreements or where they represent specialised groups of workers in 
particular geographic areas. A good example. mirrored in the South Afri-
can union movement, is that of airline pilots. Small unions may also have 
the advantage of being able to maintain a high level of service to mem-
bers and good lines of communication and participation. 
The notion that bigger is better in the case of unions has also been 
questioned on the grounds that heterogeneity of members' positions and 
interests increases as union size increases. Heterogeneity makes it more 
difficult to formulate common strategies and to mobilise members to act 
in support of demands and in solidarity with others. Larger unions may 
also be more bureaucratic and increase the risk of a greater centralisation 
of authority within an organisation at the expense of member participa-
tion. 
Changing union jurisdiction. which has traditionally involved reducing 
the overlap between the membership of unions, has also been compli-
cated by recent socio-economic developments. In many situations the 
rationale for jurisdictional reform has become less clear. The general 
approach to rationalisation of union jurisdiction has been the creation of 
industrial unions, with the broad aims of unifying union membership and 
simplifying collective bargaining along industry lines. Such aims have 
become less realistic as unions have tended to recruit members outside 
their primary jurisdiction. In many cases opportunistic organising has 
been driven by a need to maintain membership levels. But where the 
linkages between firms do not follow strict industrial demarcation. there 
may be a logic to spreading the bargaining strength of unions on other 
than purely industrial lines. 
Secondly. the increase in union mergers has had the effect of blurring 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
jurisdictional boundaries have become extremely flexible as unions have 
sought to make up for loss of membership in what were their traditional 
core areas of organisation. This trend has developed to such an extent that 
Chaison suggests that "we are well beyond the stage at which jurisdiction 
can be rationalised" (Chaison 1995: 13). 
Thirdly, the trend towards decentralised bargaining in certain countries 
has complicated the strategic rationale of aligning union structure with 
bargaining structure. Ensuring an overlap of union jurisdiction with indus-
trial sector, so that greater integration of different levels of bargaining can 
occur, is unlikely to deliver strategic gains in the face of widespread de-
centralisation of bargaining arrangements. 
The above problems point to the need for a more careful examination 
of the assumptions and goals underlying any process of rational ising 
union structure. Moreover, assumptions and goals which may have a logic 
and coherence in general terms, are really put to the test against the 
particular conditions to which they apply. Processes of rationalisation of 
labour movements may, thus, have desirable outcomes in certain situa-
tions and not in others. 
The remainder of this article will seek to spell out the assumptions con-
tained in the LRA regarding rationalisation and to discuss these in relation 
to key features of the structure of the South African union movement. 
First it will provide an overview of how the LRA may affect union struc-
ture. 
3 THE LRA AND UNION STRUCTURE 
At first glance, the LRA seems to have little bearing on union structure. 
There are no thresholds for the registration of unions, no substantive 
regulations governing amalgamation of trade unions or the operation of 
federations. The reporting and financial requirements of unions are formal 
in nature and constitute no substantial interference in the internal opera-
tion of unions. Moreover, in terms of the transitional arrangements, any 
union currently registered with the Department of Labour may obtain a 
new certificate of registration as long as it complies with the requirements 
for registration. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Labour Rela-
tions Bill put the view of the drafters in the following terms: "The pro-
posed system of registration is simple and quick and complies with the 
right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the Constitution and by 
international labour standards." (Ministry of Labour 1995: 49.) 
There is, however, one reqUirement for registration which has an im-
portant bearing on the internal structure or governance of unions and that 
relates to the constitution of unions seeking registration. The LRA requires 
unions to include basic principles of democratic governance in their 
consitutions as well as proper financial controls (s 95(5)). This requirement 
does not differ significantly from that contained in the old LRA, except 
that the procedures for election or nomination to office now have to be 
specified not only in the case of office-bearers and officials, but also of 
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removal of persons from elected or appointed positions and appeal proce-
dures also have to be specified (s 95(5)(m». Finally, the LRA requires the 
constitutions of both unions and employers' organisations to provide for 
balloting before a strike or lock-out and protection of members who refuse 
to participate in a strike or lock-out not sanctioned by majority vote 
(s 95(5)(p)(q». 
In terms of the old LRA, unions seeking registration were required to 
demonstrate representivity within the area for which they sought jurisdic-
tion. Representivity was not. however. strictly enforced by the industrial 
registrar and it would appear that membership records of unions were 
dealt with in a cursory manner. Representivity was also not enforced with 
regard to the scope for which unions were registered and multiple regis-
tration in areas of common jurisdiction was the order of the day. Fur-
thermore. minority unions were accomodated by testing their repre-
sentivity in relation to eligible membership. Thus if a union applying for 
registration sought to represent whites in particular categories of work. its 
representivity could be determined in relation to relatively small numbers 
of white workers and not in relation to the "general interests" of workers 
within a certain industrial sector. The objections of other unions to such 
registrations could then be judged according to the number of workers 
they represented within the relevant racial group (Cameron et al 1989: 
t 73). This practice encouraged a proliferation of unions. 
Under the new dispensation. representivity is not a criteria for registra-
tion, but becomes important for accessing the rights and powers available 
through the LRA. For instance, representivity is a requirement for gaining 
organisational rights (ss 12-16), applying for the establishment of statutory 
councils (s 39), entering into agency and closed shop agreements (ss 
26) and applying for the establishment of workplace forums (s 80). In 
relation to a number of these mechanisms. representivity may be 
achieved by two or more registered trade unions which jOintly represent a 
majority of the employees concerned2 (Government Gazette 16259 1995). It 
is this reliance on representivity which has led to the widespread opinion 
that the LRA favours larger unions and that it contains a majoritarian 
tendency. This reaction was captured most succinctly by Baskin and 
Satgar who note: "the LRA is profoundly majoritarian. Unions with major-
ity support get distinct advantages. Small, minority and craft-based unions 
are disadvantaged. The message for unions is clear ... grow or stagnate'" 
(Baskin and Satgar 1995: 12.) 
The rationale underlying this approach is to be found in the LRA's 
strong support for the collective bargaining process. While the LRA does 
not include a statutory duty to bargain, it supports and encourages collec-
tive bargaining through a variety of mechanisms. The most fundamental 
of these mechanisms is that of the organisational rights which registered, 
representative unions are able to acquire. These rights are clearly in-
tended to assist unions in establishing and maintaining a viable presence 











































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
in the workplace, thereby enhancing the prospects of collective bargain-
ing. The introduction of organisational rights could be viewed, in part, as a 
substitute for the statutory imposition of a duty to bargain. It is important, 
therefore, to examine more closely the criteria for gaining access to these 
rights before being able to consider the possible impact of these rights on 
the development of unions. 
4 FROM "BARGAINING UNIT" TO "WORKPLACE" 
The key prerequisite for acquiring organisational rights is, as mentioned 
above, the requirement that a union should be "representative". This begs 
the question as to which catergories of workers unions are required to be 
representative of and for which areas of jurisdiction. The concepts used in 
the LRA are those of "employees" and "workplace". Employee is defined 
as "any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for 
another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, 
any remuneration; and any other person who in any manner assists in 
carrying on or conducting the business of an employer" (s 213). A work-
place, on the other hand, is defined (except in relation to the public ser-
vice) as "the place or places where the employees of an employer work. If 
an employer carries on or conducts two or more operations that are 
independent of one another by reason of their size, function or organisa-
tion, the place or places where employees work in connection with each 
independent operation, constitutes the workplace for that operation." 
(5213.) 
These definitions have important implications for unions. At present, 
collective agreements between unions and employers generally extend 
rights to unions in respect of a particular bargaining unit, demarcated in 
terms of certain categories of employees usually defined by skill and/or 
job grade. The approach in the LRA is aimed at moving away from nar-
rowly defined bargaining units to the promotion of representivity beyond 
particular categories of workers and beyond individual company sites to 
multiple workplaces wherever a company operates at more than one site. 
Representivity applies to a registered union or to two or more registered 
unions, which suggests an encouragement of either single union bargain-
ing in workplaces or co-operation between unions in multi-union situa-
tions. 
The LRA makes a further distinction between majority unions and un-
ions that are "sufficiently representative". The latter form of representivity 
is not defined in the LRA, but in the case of disputes about the acquisition 
of organisational rights, the directives provided to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) are worth noting. The 
commissioner to whom such a dispute has been referred for arbitration 
must seek 
"{il to minimise the proliferation of trade union representation in a single 
workplace and. where possible, to encourage a system of a representative 
trade union in a workplace; and 
(ii) to minimise the financial and adminstrative burden of requiring an em-
ployer to grant organisational rights to more than one registered trade un-
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It is quite possible that these gUidelines will translate into fairly high levels 
of representivity being required. When read alongside the definitions of 
"workplace" and "employee". it is clear that a possibility exists of signifi-
cant pressure being brought to bear on smaller unions and unions that are 
not representative of all employees. Le Roux sums up the challenge to 
unions as follows: 
"The fact that the union must be representative of all employees within the 
workplace, irrespective of their rank or status, and irrespective of whether they 
are part time. probationary or temporary employees, could also make it more 
difficult for the union to establish the degree of representativeness required. It 
may then be required to recruit members from amongst groups of workers it 
has traditionally not represented or who are more difficult to recruit." (Le Roux 
1995 24.) 
This challenge to unions to broaden their representivity could have conse-
quences for union structure, but has to be considered in the context of the 
LRA's commitment to the primacy of collective bargaining and collective 
agreements in regulating relationships. The LRA specifically permits 
employers and unions to enter into agreements in respect of orgariisa-
tional rights even if the union does not have the required degree of repre-
sentivity (s 20). Previously registered unions with existing agreements are 
able to retain these (Sch 7 item 13(2». 
Ultimately. the approach to union size and structure in the LRA is a 
flexible one. There are no restrictions on union entrance to the system of 
collective bargaining through strict criteria for registration; and. once in 
the system. the overriding determinant for access the rights and powers 
offered by the legislative framework will be the collective bargaining 
process. This approach is likely to offer some protection for the ability of 
smaller unions to retain or acquire organisational rights via collective 
agreements. On the other hand, the LRA clearly intends to encourage 
rationalisation of union structure by extending organisational rights (and 
other rights contained in the LRA) to viable unions that represent all 
categories of employees, or to unions that are able to co-operate with each 
other. In this respect the legislature appeared to share the assumptions 
referred to above, to the effect that the presence of fewer, larger unions is 
to be encouraged. Smaller unions. representative of particular interests 
may continue to exist, but this will depend to a significant extent on the 
willingness of employers to recognise them. 
How might this approach affect the structure of unions in South Africa? 
To address this will require a brief detour to outline the main features 
which characterise union structure at present. 
5 UNION STRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa's union structure can be described as having evolved. much 
like the British tradition, from a predominance of craft unions in the early 
part of the century to a situation of multi-unionism in the latter part of the 
century. Within the contemporary situation of multi-unionism. the major-
ity assume the characteristics of either artisan unions, industrial unions 
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that have grown most rapidly and that contain the majority of unionised 
workers are the open industrial unions which are mainly representative of 
black workers in the lower levels of skill within their industries. They are, 
therefore, not true industrial unions in the sense of being vertical in char-
acter and encompassing of the entire organisational hierarchy within that 
industry. 
The reasons for this are relatively straightforward. The independent 
unions which emerged during the 1970s made a strategiC choice to recruit 
unorganised (in practice, predominantly black) workers irrespective of 
what jobs they did. In the context of a racial division of labour there was 
an inevitable correspondence between job category and membership of 
the emerging black unions. In some regions. union organisation pro-
ceeded within the confines of particular industrial sectors. Even where a 
model of general unionism was opted for, this tended to evolve into 
industrial unionism within a relatively short space of time. A good exam-
ple of such a shift from a regionally based, general union to a national, 
more industry-specific form of union organisation is provided by the first 
major exponent of general unionism to emerge in the 1970s, the General 
Workers Union (GWU).' Most of the general unions which did organise 
Significant numbers of workers during the 1980s were later absorbed into 
industrial unions through mergers, or went into decline. 
While the nature of industrial unionism was thus limited by the racial 
division of labour, it also exhibited a marked degree of flexibility in rela-
tion to organisational boundaries. This is true particularly for the manufac-
turing sector, where most large, industrial unions operate across a number 
of divisions. 
The thrust towards industrial unionism has occurred alongside of the 
continued presence of older craft unions and a numerically more signifi-
cant proliferation of relatively small, diverse unions which are, by and 
large, not affiliated to any of the major federations. Many of these unaffili-
ated unions would seem to operate in respect of particular interests and 
often on a quite limited geographiC basis. These unions are widely spread 
across the different sectors of the economy and represent workers from a 
range of different occupational groupings. Many appear to have remained 
in existence for a considerable period of time, despite the trend for opti-
mal union size to increase in response to the increasing cost of servicing 
members effectively (Salaman 1987: 92). Most unions have fewer than 
25000 members and only 1 1 have more than 50000 - taken across all 
sectors. In the manufacturing sector there are no more than four unions 
with more than 50000 members (Levy and Associates 1996). 
Unlike many of the advanced industrialised countries, the total number 
of unions in South Africa has thus increased significantly over the past two 
decades (see Table 1). This trend has occurred despite the consolidation, 
primarily through merger activity, of many of the larger and more dy-
namic unions. The unions reflected in Table 1 only include those that were 
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registered with the Department of Labour in terms of the old Labour 
Relations Act (28 of 1956) and thus exclude unions in the public sector, 
unions established more recently to organise agricultural workers and 
unions organising domestic workers. Within the public sector there were, 
as of 1995, 25 unions which fell under the Public Service Labour Relations 
Act of 1994, two police unions and three unions in the educational sector. 
There were also five unions in the agricultural sector. There was one union 
organising amongst domestic workers and one in the SA National Defence 
Force. An approximate total for all unions in 1995, thus, was 285. These 
285 unions represented approximately three million workers in the econ-
omy as a whole. 
The high number of unions has to be considered against a background 
where, of the total unionised workforce. over 40 % were organised by the 
19 unions affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) Taken together with the number of unions affiliated to the two 
other major federations, Federation of South African Labour (FEDSAL) and 
the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), over 60% of all organised 
workers were concentrated in not more than 42 unions. Moreover, within 
these three federations there has not been any significant fragmentation, 
with the number of affiliates remaining fairly stable over the past five 
years. The largest federation, COSATU. has experienced more rapid 
growth than the other federations and has attracted new affiliates as well 
as experiencing growth amongst some of its affiliates through mergers 
with smaller unions and staff associations. While the growth of COSATU 
and many of its key affiliates has slowed down during the 1990s, there is 
no doubt that it constitutes the dominant force within the union move-
ment as a whole. 
Looked at in this way, there would appear to be less fragmentation in 
South Africa's union structure than the high number of unions suggests. 
A final feature of the structure of the South African union movement 
which bears noting is the apparent predominance of single unionism 
within firms, at least in the manufacturing sector. Recent surveys con-
ducted within the manufacturing sector have found that firms with single 
unions are far more common than firms in which two or more unions 
operate. One national survey of 399 firms found that 48.6 % of firms had 
a single union, whereas a smaller survey of 96 unionised establishments 
in the Gauteng area found 77 % to have a single union.· In both cases, the 
probability of multiple unionism rose with the size of the plant. 
Contrary to the image of multiple unionism which is often presented, 
and which the increase in the total number of unions suggests, it therefore 
appears that firms with single unions are more common within the indus-
trial relations system. This further underlines the importance within 
4 The first survey was the SA Labour Flexibility Survey (SALFS). The second was the 
Worker Representative Survey (WRS). Both surveys formed part of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Country Review undertaken as part of the work of the Com-
prehenSive Labour Market Commission (Restructuring the South African Economy: Re-
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collective bargaining of a small number of relatively big unions, surrounded 
by many smaller. more dispersed unions representing more specific 
interests, 
But such a picture still leaves unanswered the crucial question of the 
nature of organisational fragmentation. 
6 NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANISATIONAL 
FRAGMENT ATION 
A focus on the degree of organisational fragmentation in the union 
movement might suggest that rationalisation along the lines contained in 
the LRA is a feasible option. But it would only be feasible if one could 
assume that the larger and more influential unions are able to achieve the 
degree of representivity enVisaged by the new dispensation and if it is 
realistic and politically feasible to limit the growth in the number of trade 
unions, Moreover, rationalising union structure should clearly have as its 
outcome better representation within collective bargaining and within the 
workplace. To begin to assess the prospects of such outcomes and to 
assess how unions might respond to a changing economic. political and 
legal environment in general, the nature of organisational fragmentation 
is at least as important as the degree of fragmentation, 
Understanding the nature of organisational fragmentation inevitably 
demands a sensitivity to the existing characteristics of unions - demarca-
tions between them, patterns of growth. sources of division and competi-
tion - all of which are likely to exercise tight constraints on how unions 
are able to adapt strategically and organisationally to Changes in the 
environment in which they operate, In the South African union movement 
there are a number of complex historical. political, social and organisa-
tional factors which have shaped union fragmentation, a few of which can 
be briefly highlighted, 
The most obvious and enduring source of fragmentation amongst un-
ions is that of the racial division of labour which continues to influence 
organisational boundaries and intraorganisational structure, An exception 
to this would be some unions and staff associations in the finance and 
public sector. such as the SA Society of Bank Officials (SASBO). where 
membership spans a broader spectrum within the occupational hierarchy, 
The reflection of the racially-based occupational structure in union mem-
bership composition has also served to provide particular identities for 
unions. The predominantly black unions have been characterised by mili-
tant. anti-apartheid policies and strategies. combined with decentralisation 
of authority and power within their organisations. whereas unions of more 
skilled and white-collar workers have tended toward greater internal 
centralisation and more moderate (or conservative) economic and political 
policies, 
Organisational boundaries and intraorganisational structure also bear a 
relationship to the exercise of market power. In this respect. craft unions 
and unions of skilled and white collar workers have been able to control 
access to jobs and to determine wage rates through institutional mecha-
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unions have relied on collective bargaining, backed up by the threat of 
industrial action. Union size and density have been relatively more impor-
tant to the industrial unions within this schema. as numbers have been 
critical to the exercise of power in collective bargaining. 
While the racial division of labour has been central to the enduring na-
ture of union fragmentation. its continued relevance as a source of frag-
mentation is constrained by the slow growth in skilled jobs and skilled 
personnel and by the upward mobility of black workers into semi-skilled 
and skilled occupations. many of whom are attracted to the open indus-
trial unions of COSATU and NACTU. This trend is borne out by the lack of 
growth amongst the old craft unions for example. unions such as the SA 
Boilermakers and the SA Electrical Workers Union. Some affiliates of 
COSA TU have also reponed growth in membership amongst skilled and 
white collar workers. but the numbers are not significant enough to sug-
gest any real change in the organisational fragmentation shaped by the 
racial division of labour (Baskin 1994 and 1996). 
Despite the constraints on ongOing fragmentation arising from the divi-
sion of jobs and skills along lines of race. this phenomenon is likely to act 
as a real obstacle to increased union representivity within the workplace. 
Differing organisational identities and strategies which have been heavily 
influenced by the apartheid workplace will militate against the ability of 
unions to represent a broader spectrum of wage earners within firms. 
Representivity is. in most cases. likely to continue to be determined within 
the existing context of bargaining units. and changes are more likely to 
come about through developing co-operation between unions in multi-
union workplaces. 
The likelihood of co-operation between unions rather than the devel-
opment of inclusive union organisation in workplaces is furthered by 
another underlying source of union fragmentation. namely political divi-
sions within the union movement. Political divisions have historically 
overlapped with racial divisions to a large extent. and have also cross-cut 
racial groups and skill divisions. They have served to divide unions at the 
workplace level and the federation level where. despite co-operation in 
forums such as NEDLAC. political differences continue to shape the inter-
nal affairs of the federations and their relations with other groupings. 
A final dimension of organisational fragmentation is a spatial one. Al-
though not enough information is available to establish a clear map of the 
union movement and its areas of geographiC concentration. it seems very 
likely that the open industrial unions predominate in larger workplaces 
concentrated in the urban areas. whereas newer unions have been devel-
oping in smaller centres and in areas on the periphery of the major indus-
trial centres. A marked characteristic of unions registering during 1995 
was their general nature - of 44 newly registered unions. half were regis-
tered for a range of industries. A good example is that of the SA General 
and Allied Workers Union which registered early in 1995 for the com-
mercial distributive trade. the printing and newspaper industry, security 
services in Durban. farming undertakings in Alfred. Lower Tugela and 
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If it is the case that the union movement is predominantly concentrated 
in larger urban centres and in particular industries or occupational groups, 
then the definition of "workplace" in the LRA could pose an important 
challenge. As mentioned above, "workplace" may refer to the various 
operations carried out by an employer and unions may be required to be 
representative in all these different locations. Multiple operations are more 
characteristic of the commercial. retail and service sector and existing 
unions in these sectors may be faced with having to establish an organ-
isational presence in geographic areas where they have not operated 
previously. The organisational and financial implications of doing so are 
likely to pose severe problems for many unions and it is also likely that 
the larger unions will face stiff competition from recently established 
unions in these smaller centres. Even in cases where large, established 
unions are able to determine bargaining arrangements through collective 
agreements. rather than by reference to the LRA. a problem of competi-
tion from other unions may. nevertheless, become more pronounced. as 
will the demands from wage earners whose conditions become affected 
by agreements set in more centralised forums. 
The above aspects of union fragmentation - the racial division of la-
bour, political differences and the problem of spatial coverage - all pose 
problems for the changes to union structure envisaged by the LRA. But it 
seems clear that the larger unions. which are better resourced and hence 
in a position to be more responsive to members' needs. will be best 
placed to respond to the Challenges posed to union structure. This is not. 
however. to imply that smaller unions are not deSirable or that they 
cannot be effective in relation to their members' interests. Quite the 
contrary: there may be a clear logic to the organisational and administra-
tive effectiveness of smaller unions in certain areas and for certain cate-
gories of wage earner. As long as unions are able to articulate their 
membership interests. are powerful enough to satisfy some of these 
interests and allow involvement in decision-making. then size is not 
necessarily relevant to their effectiveness. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Until the early 1980s. South African labour legislation adopted a highly 
interventionist approach to the question of union recognition and the 
organisational forms that unions should assume at least in terms of 
whom they were able to represent. Since the early 1980s, this practice 
changed to allow for statutory recognition of non-racial unions. But the 
changes to labour legislation in the post-Wiehahn period contained no 
clear policy regarding issues of union structure and the result has been a 
continued proliferation of unions. many of which may well be in a posi-
tion to claim representativeness only in relation to particular racial or 
occupational groups. 
The LRA opts for a flexible approach to union structure. allowing for a 
continuation of the status quo via collective agreements. and relies on a 
notion of representivity which may be used to decide on access to the 










































I DOES SIZE MA TIER? LABOUR RELA nONS ACT, MAJORlTARIANISM &. UNION STRUCTUREI 
Representivity as related to a broader range of employees in firms and 
to the various operations of employers may be desirable in theory, but 
does not bear much relation to the way in which the structure of unions 
has evolved in the SA labour movement, particularly as regards the range 
of employees covered by union organisation. Furthermore, the practical 
implication of this is likely to be a privileging of larger unions. To the 
extent that this development corresponds to a more effective representa-
tion of the interests of wage earners, it is clearly to be welcomed. But it 
would be detrimental to existing unions and emerging unions if decisions 
about organisational rights are made purely on administrative grounds, 
that is, in relation to possible costs to employers of having to deal with 
more than one union, or on the assumption that small unions are necess-
arily ineffective. 
Change in union structure is inevitably a gradual and evolving process 
which is influenced, in part, by legislative change. It is also influenced by 
change in the structure of collective bargaining and, very importantly, by 
the choices that unions make in order to pursue their goals. While some 
unions may choose to broaden their representativeness, they will un-
doubtedly face organisational, political and cultural constraints in moving 
from their present style of organisation to one that is able to represent a 
more diverse range of interests. A change to majoritarian unionism, as 
enVisaged by the LRA, is thus unlikely to come about in the short term. 
What is more likely is that the LRA may serve to strengthen union co-
operation within the new institutional structures: bargaining and statutory 
councils and workplace forums. In an industrial relations and bargaining 
environment that is becoming more competitive and more constrained by 
economic pressures, there are likely to be greater incentives for inter-
union co-operation and coalition-building at workplace, sectoral and 
national levels. Some increase in union merger activity may result from 
such a trend. But whether it will lead to a shift away from the old lines of 
political and occupational demarcation that characterise the South African 
union movement, remains to be seen. 
TABLE 1; Number of Trade Unions and Federations 1980-1995 
YEAR NUMBER OF UNIONS NUMBER OF FEDERATIONS 
1980 188 11 
1981 200 J 1 
1982 199 13 
1983 194 13 
1984 193 12 
1985 196 12 
1986 195 It 
1987 205 1 I 
1988 209 10 
1989 212 10 
1990 198 10 
1991 195 7 
1992 195 11 
1993 201 8 
1994 213 9 
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